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INTRODUCTION
Since the late 1970s when the scourge of child pornography first
reached public consciousness, courts and legislatures have struggled to find
.Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law.
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the proper balance between First Amendment freedom of expression and
protecting children from abuse and exploitation. Rapidly advancing
technology has changed the ways in which crimes against children are
committed, yet judicial and legislative action to address new technology has
produced uneven results. Congress' first attempt at expanding the
definition of child pornography to include computer-generated images that
"appeared to be" child pornography or were advertised in a manner that
"conveyed the impression" they involved minors was struck down by the
Supreme Court.1 Congress responded by enacting the "Prosecutorial
Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today Act
of 2003" ("PROTECT Act") that bans, among other things, speech that
"knowingly... advertises, promotes, presents, distributes, or
solicits.., any material or purported material in a manner that reflects the
belief, or that is intended to cause another to believe" that it is child
pornography.2
The 2008 Supreme Court decision in United States v. Williams upheld
the constitutionality of the PROTECT Act and ruled that offers to engage in
illegal activity are excluded from First Amendment protection.
3
Accordingly, even if images of child pornography are computer-generated,
the speech offering or seeking them can be proscribed. The Court rested its
holding on an analogy between the PROTECT Act's pandering provision
and other common inchoate offenses, such as attempt.
This Article examines one aspect of the Williams decision-its reliance
on the doctrine of impossibility, a moribund area of attempt liability until its
revival in the Internet age. Traditionally, courts made a division between
factual impossibility (which was not a defense to attempt liability) and legal
impossibility (which was a defense). In simple terms, factual impossibility
occurs when a defendant fails to complete a crime because of a missing
factual element, while legal impossibility results from a missing legal
element. The classic case of legal impossibility involved a sting operation
against a person who believed he was purchasing stolen goods. He
successfully raised the defense of legal impossibility because the legal
element required by the stolen property statute-stolen goods-was
1 In Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 258 (2002), the Court held that virtual
child pornography was protected by the First Amendment because actual children were not
involved in its production.
218 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(3)(B) (2006).
3128 S. Ct. 1830, 1841, 1846-47 (2008).
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missing. In comparison, the classic factual impossibility involved the
would-be thief who picked an empty pocket.
The rationale behind differentiating the two scenarios is linked to
outward behavior. Compare receiving property to reaching into a person's
pocket property. From outward appearances, the former appears perfectly
innocent, while the latter raises alarm. We can infer a bad intent much
more readily from the pickpocket than from the person who receives
property. Shielding legally impossible attempts stemmed from a distrust of
prosecutorial methods to establish a defendant's blameworthy intent from
outwardly innocent appearing behavior.
The impossibility doctrine's main difficulty was distinguishing between
factual and legal impossibility. A number of modem courts and legislatures
addressed the problem by declaring the difference was purely semantic and
eliminated the impossibility defense, focusing instead on whether a crime
would have been committed had the facts been as defendant believed them
to be. The solution appeared to resolve the issue that had long bedeviled
courts and scholars, and little effort was made by defendants to raise an
impossibility defense.
The Internet Age revived debate about the two types of impossibility.
As personal computers and online social networks grew in popularity,
children were increasingly approached by sexual predators. Federal and
state law enforcement agencies set up sting operations in which police
officers would go online posing as minors and wait to be approached by
predators. Defendants caught in these Internet sting operations claimed that
it was legally impossible for them to be charged with attempting to commit
crimes against minors when they were communicating with police officers.
A number of courts agreed. Although most appellate courts have ultimately
ruled that the issue is one of factual impossibility, lingering doubts persist.
This Article posits that the Williams Court properly upheld Congress'
shift in focus from the images to the speech pandering them. The majority
ruled that the inability to complete a crime because of a factual error is not a
defense. Its reasoning should lay to rest lingering claims that child
protection statutes require an actual child. Nevertheless, the Article
explains that the Williams dissent essentially relied on legal impossibility in
its finding that the PROTECT Act's pandering provision was
unconstitutionally overbroad. In so doing, the dissent reflects the
reluctance of many to accept the extent to which adults are seeking to harm
children and how accessible the Internet has made children available to
them. This Article cautions that the dissent has improperly revitalized the
20091
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legal impossibility defense, which is particularly dangerous in the Internet
age.
Part One of this Article gives a brief overview of the child pornography
laws. Part Two describes the background and reasoning of the Williams
opinion. Part Three gives the history of the impossibility doctrine including
an analysis of its use in Williams. Part Four proposes that the rationale
behind impossibility doctrine supports the majority view that Congress
properly banned the pandering or soliciting of what a person believes to be
child pornography regardless of whether an actual child is depicted.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Beginning of the Legislative/Judicial Dance
Following an increased public awareness of the scourge of child
pornography in the late 1970s, Congress passed the Protection of Children
Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977.4 The Act prohibited anyone from
using a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of
producing a visual image of such conduct with the knowledge that it would
be transported in interstate or foreign commerce. This early federal
legislation applied only to child pornography that was obscene and used for
commercial purposes.
During this same time period, states were also enacting their own bans
on child pornography. 6 In contrast to early federal legislation, some states
outlawed the production and distribution of child pornography without
requiring that it be obscene. New York was one such state, and the
challenge to its statute led to the 1982 landmark ruling in New York v.
Ferber, where the United States Supreme Court ruled that child
pornography was not protected by the First Amendment even if it was not
obscene.' The Court reasoned that the "use of children as subjects of
pornographic materials is harmful to the physiological, emotional, and
4 Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-225, 92
Stat. 7 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2253 (2006)). See generally ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY, FINAL REPORT 408-15 (1986); EVA J. KLAIN ET AL., CHILD
PORNOGRAPHY: THE CRIMNAL-JUSTICE-RESPONSE 12 (NCMEC 2001).
5 Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act § 2.
6 See Amy Adler, Inverting the First Amendment, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 921, 928-29 (2001).
'458 U.S. 747, 758 (1982).
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mental health of the child.",8  It stressed that child pornography was
"intrinsically related to the sexual abuse of children in at least two ways.
First, the materials produced are a permanent record of the children's
participation and the harm to the child is exacerbated by their circulation." 9
Second, the distribution network for child pornography has to be closed to
prevent the production of such material.10
Following Ferber, Congress amended the original federal child
pornography legislation in 1984 to remove the obscenity and commercial
purpose requirements.l" Although the Supreme Court had previously ruled
that possession of obscene materials was protected by the First
Amendment, 12 some states were enacting legislation that banned possessing
and viewing child pornography. Constitutional challenges to these
possession statutes provided the next opportunity for the Supreme Court to
reaffirm the dual rationale of child pornography legislation. In Osborne v.
Ohio, the Court ruled the mere possession or viewing of child pornography
victimized children and the State could prohibit it.13 The Court stated the
ban on possessing or viewing child pornography was enacted "to protect the
victims of child pornography; it hopes to destroy a market for the
8 id.
9 d. at 759. One could say the actual harm is inflicted in two ways: the abuse to the victim in
its creation and the injury to the victim by publication of the images.
'ld.
"Child Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-292, 98 Stat. 204 (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2251-2253 (2006)). The production of child pornography was so clandestine that between
1978 and 1984, only one person was convicted for producing child pornography under the 1977
Act. See ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY, FINAL REPORT 604-05
(1986). Thus, the need to stop the flow of child pornography became the better route for
prosecutors.
12 See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 559 (1969). The Stanley Court reasoned that
prohibiting the possession of obscene materials in one's home was inimical to the very premise of
the First Amendment's protection against state interference with what a person thinks, reads or
views in the privacy of his home. Id. at 564. The specifically rejected the State's claim that it had
a legitimate interest in banning the possession of obscene material because it may lead to sexual
violence. Id. at 566. The Stanley Court stated not only was there no empirical evidence that
supported the State's claim, but crime prevention is better served by "education and punishment
for violations of the law" than by criminalizing anticipatory conduct. Id. at 566-67. The Stanley
Court also rejected the State's contention that criminalizing possession was needed to support the
State's ban on the distribution of obscene materials, reasoning that this need did not justify a ban
on what a person read or viewed in his home. Id. at 567-68.
13495 U.S. 103, 110 (1990).
2009]
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exploitative use of children."' 14 Congress shortly followed Ohio's lead and
passed the Child Protection Restoration and Penalties Enhancement Act of
1990, which banned the possession of child pornography. 15
B. Congress' First Ban on Virtual Pornography
The advent of computer technology and the Internet led to congressional
concerns that existing legislation was out of date. It enacted the Child
Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 (CPPA) that expanded the definition
of child pornography in two ways. First, it extended the definition to
encompass an image that "is or appears to be, a minor engaging in sexually
explicit conduct."'16 Second, it included as child pornography materials that
are "advertised, promoted, presented, described, or distributed in such a
manner that conveys the impression that the material is or contains a visual
depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct."'
' 7
Congress' ban on pornographic images of such virtual children was
based on congressional findings of compelling state interests in protecting
actual children from all child pornography, whether depicting real or virtual
children. The legislative history of the CPPA was premised on thirteen
findings, including that pedophiles use images of child pornography to
seduce actual children to engage in sexual conduct by reducing their
inhibitions and desensitizing them.' 8 Additionally, it found both real and
virtual child pornography whetted the appetite of molesters by fueling their
14Id. at 109. The Court distinguished its ruling in Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568
(1969), which held that the private possession of adult obscene material was protected by the First
Amendment. Id. The Stanley Court reasoned that prohibiting the possession of obscene materials
in one's home was inimical to the very premise of the First Amendment's protection against state
interference with what a person thinks, reads or views in the privacy of his home. Stanley, 394
U.S. at 564. The Osborne Court held that the State's interest in protecting children by banning
possession of child pornography outweighed a defendant's First Amendment rights because of the
harm inflicted to children by all involved in the child pornography chain. Osborne, 495 U.S. at
110.
1518 U.S.C. § 2252 (2006). The legislation banned the possession of three or more images of
child pornography. Id. § 2252(c). Subsequent legislation banned possessing any images, but
created an affirmative defense for possession of less than three images and took steps to destroy
the images and reported them to the authorities. Id. § 2252A(5)(d).
16Id. § 2256(8)(B) (repealed 2003).
"1Id. § 2256(8)(D) (repealed 2003).
18Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 121, 110 Stat. 3009,
3009-26; see Daniel S. Armagh, Virtual Child Pornography: Criminal Conduct or Protected
Speech?, 23 CARDOzO L. REV. 1993, 1997 (2002).
[Vol. 61:2
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fantasies and stimulating their desire to molest an actual child.1 9 Congress
found further the child pornography prosecutions would be increasingly
difficult as images of virtual children become indistinguishable from actual
victims of child pornography. 20 The ban on virtual pornography created a
wealth of commentary2 and a split between the circuits.
22
C. The Judicial Response: Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition
In 2001, the United States Supreme Court, in a 6-3 decision, resolved
the debate by striking down the ban on pornography using virtual children,
ruling that the "appears to be" language of the CPPA was overbroad and
unconstitutional.2 3 The majority opinion, written by Justice Kennedy,
stressed that the premise of excluding child pornography from First
Amendment protection was that it was intrinsically related to abuse of an
24
actual child. It concluded that direct harm is missing in virtual
pornography, and therefore it cannot be banned2 5
The majority rejected the government's indirect harm arguments. It
ruled that the risks of virtual pornography whetting the appetite of child
molesters, or being shown by molesters to seduce children, were too remote
to support abridging of constitutionally protected speech.26 In addition, the
majority disagreed with the government's position that prohibiting virtual
pornography is necessary to dry up the market for actual child pornography
19 Armagh, supra note 18, at 1997.
20Child Pornography Prevention Act § 121. Specifically, it found that "new photographic
and computer imaging technologies, make it possible to produce by electronic, mechanical, or
other means, visual depictions of what appear to be children engaging in sexually explicit conduct
that are virtually indistinguishable to the unsuspecting viewer" from images of actual children.
21See, e.g., Debra D. Burke, The Criminalization of Virtual Child Pornography: A
Constitutional Question, 34 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 439 (1997); David T. Cox, Litigating Child
Pornography and Obscenity Cases in the Internet Age, 4 J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 1, 38 n.88 (1999).
22 Four circuits upheld the CPPA. See generally United States v. Fox, 248 F.3d 394 (5th Cir.
2001); United States v. Mento, 231 F.3d 912 (4th Cir. 2000); United States v. Acheson, 195 F.3d
645 (1 1th Cir. 1999); United States v. Hilton, 167 F.3d 61 (1st Cir. 1999). The Ninth Circuit
found the CPPA to be invalid on its face. Free Speech Coal. v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083, 1097 (9th
Cir. 1999).
23Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 258 (2002).
24 1d. at 249 (quoting New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759 (1982)).
251d. at 250-51.
26 1d. at 251-54.
2009]
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because they are part of the same market.27  It also rejected the
government's claim that advances in computer technology will make it
increasingly difficult to distinguish between actual and virtual pornography,
28
allowing real pornographers to escape prosecution.
The majority also upheld challenges to the CPPA's pandering section
prohibiting materials that conveyed the impression of a minor engaged in
sexually explicit conduct. 29  The Court noted the provision prohibited
possession of a sexually explicit film containing no minors merely because
it was promoted as containing minors. 30 Thus, "[m]aterials ... are tainted
and unlawful in the hands of all who receive it, though they bear no
responsibility for how it was marketed."' As such, the Court found the ban
unconstitutionally overbroad because, it "does more than prohibit
pandering. It prohibits possession of material described, or pandered, as
child pornography by someone earlier in the distribution chain."
32
In her concurring and dissenting opinion, Justice O'Connor agreed that
the "appears to be" language in the CPPA was overbroad because it could
be used to infringe on images of youthful looking adults, but she would
have upheld the ban on virtual child pornography that is "virtually
indistinguishable from" actual child pornography.33 She also agreed that
the "conveys the impression" pandering provision was overly broad.34 In
his concurring opinion, Justice Thomas noted that should technology reach
the point where the government is unable to distinguish between actual and
virtual pornography, and therefore unable to prosecute the former,
regulation of the latter would be permissible.35
Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice Scalia, agreed with Justice
O'Connor that the government had a compelling interest in protecting
children from the harm of sexual abuse and that technological advances will
soon make it nearly impossible for the government to protect children from
27 1d. at 254. It noted the reverse-that allowing virtual pornography could in fact protect
children by drying up the market of actual child pornography. Id.
2 Id. at 254-55.
29 1d. at 257.
30
id.
31id.
32 Id at 258.
33 1d. at 263-64 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
34Id. at 262.
351d. at 259-60 (Thomas, J., concurring).
330 [Vol. 61:2
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sexual abuse.3 6  In addition, according to the Chief Justice, the CPPA's
prohibition on advertising and promoting did not reach any further than the
"sordid business of pandering" that was already unprotected by the First
Amendment.
37
D. Congress' Next Effort: The "Prosecutorial Remedies and Other
Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003" or
PROTECT Act
Following Free Speech Coalition, Congress once again strove to
triangulate among technology, the First Amendment, and protecting
children. It found that technology existed "to disguise depictions of real
children to make them unidentifiable and to make depictions of real
children appear to be computer-generated."38  It found further that
"technology will soon exist, if it does not already, to computer generate
realistic images of children."
39
Based on these findings, Congress enacted the PROTECT Act to amend
existing child pornography laws and define child pornography as including
images that are "indistinguishable from" that of a minor. 40 In a direct nod
to Justice O'Connor, Congress defined the term "indistinguishable" to mean
a depiction that is "virtually indistinguishable, in that the depiction is such
36 Id. at 267-68 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The Chief Justice found that the CPPA could
have been interpreted to reach only what was previously unprotected speech. Id. at 268.
According to the Chief Justice, the CPPA would only ban hard-core pornography involving actual
sexual activity between youthful looking adult actors, not mere suggestions of sexual activity that
are advertised or promoted as child pornography. Id. at 269. Furthermore, Chief Justice
Rehnquist noted that Congress intended for the CPPA to only reach those computer-generated
images that are easily mistaken for pictures of actual children engaging in sexual conduct. Id.
The CPPA proscribed images that are virtually indistinguishable from pictures of actual children,
not depictions of Shakespearean tragedies, as the majority purported. Id. at 269-70. In addition,
the Chief Justice noted that actual movie producers never felt the chill of protected speech that the
majority claimed would occur from the CPPA as evidenced by the Best Picture Oscars garnered
by the films noted by the majority. Id. at 271.
37Id. at 271-72. Agreeing with Justice O'Connor, Chief Justice Rehnquist suggested that the
provision could be constitutionally limited by requiring that a possessor know the material
contains images of real minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct or virtually indistinguishable
computer-generated image. Id. at 273.
38 Prosecutorial Remedies and Tools Against Exploitation of Children Today Act (PROTECT
Act) of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 501(5), 117 Stat. 650, 676.
39 1d.
4018 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B) (2006).
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that an ordinary person viewing the depiction would conclude that the
depiction is of an actual minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct.",4' To
fit within Free Speech Coalition's mandate, the definition expressly
excludes depictions "that are drawings, cartoons, sculptures, or paintings
depicting minors or adults. 42
Congress also responded to the Free Speech Coalition Court's rejection
of the CPPA's "conveys the impression" pandering provision by enacting a
new offense that punished anyone who:
knowingly advertises, promotes, presents, distributes, or
solicits through the mails ... or in ... interstate or foreign
commerce by any means, including by computer, any
material or purported material in a manner that reflects the
belief, or that is intended to cause another to believe, that
the material or purported material is, or contains (i) an
obscene visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually
explicit conduct; or (ii) a visual depiction of an actual
minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.43
Over some concerns about the proposed pandering provision,4 4 the
Senate Judiciary Committee reaffirmed that the pandering offense did not
require proof that the materials offered or solicited actually existed:
411d. § 2256(11).
421d. The PROTECT Act also amended the CPPA's affirmative defense that the Free Speech
Court found too narrow. First, Congress extended the affirmative defense beyond producers and
distributors to those who possess child pornography. Id. § 2252A(d). Second, the affirmative
defense allows defendants to prove that the images were created completely by computer
graphics. Id. § 2252A(c). In addition, the PROTECT Act creates a new crime of obscene child
pornography that provides for harsher penalties than ordinary obscenity. 18 U.S.C. § 1466A
(2006).
4118 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(3)(B) (2006).
44S. REP. No. 108-2, at 16, 23-24 (2003). Much of the concern was over the inclusion of
"purported materials." According to critics, this criminalizes speech even when no prohibited
materials exist. Id. at 29, 32. A noted constitutional scholar, Frederick Schauer, opined that the
Supreme Court had never accepted pandering as an independent offense, but that it might be an
acceptable offense if it limited to commercial speech. Including "purported materials" the
provision is less likely to be viewed as commercial speech and more likely to be unconstitutional.
149 CONG. REC. 4233 (2003). The Williams Court rejected all of Professor Shauer's concerns.
See infra notes 77-78 and accompanying text. Even the dissent found no difficulty with the
"purported materials" language. See infra note 89 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 6 1:2
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The crux of what this provision bans is the offer to transact
in this unprotected material, coupled with proof of the
offender's specific intent .... The provision makes clear
that no actual materials need exist; the government
establishes a violation with proof of the communication and
requisite specific intent.45
This view was in accord with the Department of Justice's position that
no constitutional bar prevented Congress from enacting crimes such as
attempt or conspiracy, and that the pandering provision fell with such
inchoate offenses.46
The new law was challenged by Michael Williams, who was convicted
of pandering sexually explicit photographs of his four-year-old daughter
over the Internet. The next section describes the case in detail.
II. UNITED STATES V. WILLIAMS
A. Background
Michael Williams, an admitted child pornographer, was caught in an
Internet sting operation.47 Williams had posted in the public area of a chat
room the following message: "Dad of toddler had 'good' pics of her an [sic]
me swap of your toddler pics, or live cam. 4 8 A federal undercover agent
and Williams then engaged in private chats and swapped non-pornographic
photographs.49 After the initial exchange, Williams told the agent the
following: "I've got hc [hard core] pictures of me and dau, and other guys
eating her out--do you? ?50 Following a series of exchanges, Williams
posted a message in the public part of the chat room that contained a
hyperlink to seven images of child pornography. 51 Federal agents traced the
photos and messages to Williams and executed a search warrant of his
45S. REP. No. 108-2, at 12 (2003).
46See H.R. REP. No. 107-526, at 23 (2002).
47 United States v. Williams, 128 S. Ct. 1830, 1837 (2008).
481d.
4 9
1d.
50United States v. Williams, 444 F.3d 1286, 1288 (11th Cir. 2006), rev'd, 128 S. Ct. 1830
(2008).
"' Williams, 128 S. Ct. at 1837.
2009]
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home.52 They seized two computer hard drives that contained at least
twenty-two pornographic images of mostly pre-pubescent children. 3
The government charged Williams with one pandering count under the
new PROTECT Act provision described above, 54 and one count of
possession of child pornography.5 Williams filed a motion to dismiss the
pandering charge on the grounds of vagueness and over breadth. 6 While
the motion was pending, Williams agreed to plead guilty to both counts,
while reserving his right to challenge the constitutionality of the pandering
count.5 7  Following the district court's denial of defendant's motion to
dismiss, it sentenced Williams to concurrent sixty-month terms on the
pandering and possession counts.58
B. The Eleventh Circuit Ruling
The Eleventh Circuit reversed the pandering conviction, holding the
statute overbroad and vague under a strict scrutiny analysis.5 9 First, it found
it problematic that the statute prohibited the pandering of materials
"purported" to be child pornography, even if no images existed.60 It warned
that "any promoter--be they a braggart, exaggerator, or outright liar"-who
claims to have child pornography could be subject to up to twenty years in
prison, even if the images are completely legal.61 Second, the Eleventh
Circuit noted that the First Amendment protected speech that advocated
illegal activity as long as it did not incite it.62 Accordingly, the Court found
521d.
"Id. at 1837-38.
4 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(3)(B) (2006). See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
"Title 18, § 2252A(a)(5)(B).
56United States v. Williams, 444 F.3d 1286, 1289 (11th Cir. 2006), rev'd, 128 S. Ct. 1830
(2008).
571d.
58Id. The pandering count has a sixty-month minimum mandatory sentence. Title 18
§ 2252A(b)(1). The possession count allows for a sentence up to 120 months. Id. § 2252A(b)(2).
51 Williams, 444 F.3d at 1298-1300. The court upheld the possession sentence. Id. at 1309.
See generally Stephen T. Fairchild, Protecting the Least of These: A New Approach to Child
Pornography Pandering Provisions, 57 DUKE. L.J. 163 (2007).
60 Williams, 444 F.3d at 1298.
61 id.
62Id.
[Vol. 61:2
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"the non-commercial, non-inciteful promotion of illegal child pornography,
even if repugnant, is protected speech. 63
Third, the Eleventh Circuit found it "particularly objectionable" the
pandering provision criminalized speech that "reflects the belief' that
materials constitute child pornography, regardless of the actual nature or
existence of the underlying material.64 This allows liability to be based on
"deluded" beliefs that images are of real children or are lascivious. 65 Thus,
a person who is sexually excited by perfectly legal images could be
punished under the statute. According to the Eleventh Circuit, "[w]e
cannot... outlaw those legal and mainstream materials and we may not
outlaw the thoughts conjured up by those legal materials., 66 Accordingly, it
rejected the Government's position that the pandering provision be regarded
as a simple inchoate offense that only punishes those who have the specific
intent to traffic in child pornography.67
Finally, the Eleventh Circuit found the pandering provision was
constitutionally vague because it was not at all clear about what was meant
by the "in a manner that reflects the belief, or that is intended to cause
another to believe" language.68 Conjuring a number of hypotheticals where
ambiguously labeled photos could snare the predator but also the innocent
grandparent, the court stated that Congress has given law enforcement too
much discretion to determine whether a person has violated the statute.69
The court pointed out again that the statute did not require actual child
63
1d.
6Id. at 1298-99 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(3)(B)(ii) (Supp. IV 2004)).65 Id. The federal statute defines child pornography to include, in addition to images of
minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct, the "lascivious exhibition of [a minor's] genitals or
pubic area." 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2)(A)(v) (2006).
66 Williams, 444 F.3d at 1299-1300. It also found that legislative findings did not explain
how the pandering of otherwise legal material could support the state's compelling interest in
protecting children from sexual exploitation. Id. at 1303. It rejected what it claimed to be the
government's attempt to resurrect both market deterrence and market proliferation theories that
restricting materials pandered as child pornography will protect children. Id. at 1303-04. It noted
that "Congress has failed to articulate specifically how the pandering and solicitation of legal
images, even if they are promoted or believed to be otherwise, fuels the market for illegal images
of real children engaging in sexually explicit conduct." Id. at 1303.
67Id. at 1304-05.
"Id. at 1306-07.
69 see infra note 177 and accompanying text
2009]
HeinOnline -- 61 Baylor L. Rev. 335 2009
BA YLOR LA WREVIEW
pornography be traded and that this absence made the statute impermissibly
vague.7 °
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, and in May 2008
reversed the Eleventh Circuit in a 7-2 opinion.
C. The Supreme Court Ruling
1. The Majority
The majority opinion authored by Justice Scalia 71 acknowledged the
Internet has allowed child pornography to proliferate despite previous
legislative efforts, and upheld the constitutionality of the PROTECT Act
pandering provision as a "carefully crafted" response.72 The Court noted
unlike the statutes it construed in Ferber, Osborne, and Free Speech
Coalition, the PROTECT Act provision does not require the actual
existence of child pornography because rather than targeting the underlying
material, it "bans the collateral speech that introduces such material into the
child pornography distribution network., 73  The Court made clear that
"offers to provide or requests to obtain child pornography are categorically
excluded from the First Amendment.,
74
The Court found five features of the pandering provision important to its
analysis. First is that it has a scienter requirement. 75 The statute is limited
to those who act "knowingly." Second, its operative
language-"advertises, promotes, presents, distributes, or solicits"-all
have a transactional connotation.76 While noting this element prevents
punishment for abstract advocacy of illegal activity, 77 the Court stressed
that the transaction need not be commercial.78 Third and fourth, the statute
conditions the culpable transactions to those undertaken, "in a manner that
reflects the belief or that is intended to cause another to believe" that they
7 Id. at 1307.
71 Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Thomas, Breyer and Alito joined in
the majority. Justice Stevens also filed a concurring opinion joined by Justice Breyer.
72 United States v. Williams, 128 S. Ct. 1830, 1846-47 (2008).
73 1d. at 1838-39.
74 Id. at 1842.
71d. at 1839.
76id.
77Id. at 1842 (citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-48 (1969)).
781d. at 1840.
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involve child pornography.79 The Court found that the first condition ("in a
manner that reflects the belief") protects against overbroad application
because it contains subjective and objective elements.80 A defendant must
actually believe he is offering child pornography, and his statement or
action must lead a reasonable person to understand the defendant thinks he
is offering child pornography. 8 The Court explained the second condition
("is intended to cause another to believe") contains only a subjective
component: the defendant must intend another to believe the material to be
child pornography and must advertise, promote, present, distribute or solicit
the material in a manner that he thinks will cause that belief in another
person.82 Fifth, the statute's definition of "sexually explicit conduct" fell
well within constitutionally approved definitions.8 3
The Court dismissed the Eleventh Circuit's concern that prosecutors
could use this provision to punish someone based on deluded beliefs or who
mistakenly distributed virtual child pornography as real child
pornography.84 Noting that the Act created an inchoate offense, the Court
stated "offers to deal in illegal products or otherwise engage in illegal
activity do not acquire First Amendment protection when the offeror is
mistaken about the factual predicate of his offer., 85 The Court reasoned
that factual impossibility is not a defense to other inchoate offenses such as
attempt or conspiracy, and should not be a defense to the new pandering
provision.86 Instead, like the would-be drug dealer who mistakenly sells the
wrong substance or the traitor who seeks what he believes to be privileged
documents, culpability should be measured according to the circumstances
as defendant believed them to be rather than what they were in fact.87 Thus,
even if no child pornography exists, as long as the defendant is offering or
seeking illegal material (and not just engaging in abstract advocacy) he falls
outside of the First Amendment.
79
1d.
801d.
81 id.
821d.
831d. at 1840-41 (noting that the statute's definition went beyond the "sexual conduct"
language it upheld in Ferber).
"Id. at 1843.
851d.
861d.
87Id. (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 cmt. (1985)).
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The Court further rejected the Eleventh Circuit's finding that the statute
was void for vagueness. It explained a statute is not void simply because
there may be close cases with respect to the sender or receiver's intent. It
noted that "[w]hat renders a statute vague is not the possibility that it will
sometimes be difficult to determine whether the incriminating fact it
establishes has been proved; but rather the indeterminacy of precisely what
that fact is." '88 In other words, what constitutes child pornography is not
ambiguous; rather whether the sender intended to present images as child
pornography may be at issue, but that do not invalidate the statute. The
Court also rejected the dissent's position, as further discussed below, that it
was overruling Free Speech Coalition.89 It stressed that an offer to trade in
virtual pornography was still protected as long as it was offered and sought
as such. 90 It rejected the dissent's position that the statute exempts those
who mistakenly offer virtual pornography as depicting real children by
again stressing that "[t]here is no First Amendment exception from the
general principle of criminal law that a person attempting to commit a crime
need not be exonerated because he has a mistaken view of the facts."9'
2. The Dissent
Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsburg, agreed with the majority that
the Act is constitutional in one situation: if the proposals to distribute or
obtain child pornography are unrelated to any extant image.92 In this
instance, the factual impossibility of completing the transfer is not a defense
to prosecution because proposing an illegal transaction is not protected by
the First Amendment. 93 However, the dissent was greatly troubled by the
statute's application to proposals about existing photographs. Because the
existing image may be entirely computer-generated child pornography, the
dissent argued that the Act punishes proposals to transfer constitutionally
protected material.94
88 d. at 1846; see infra note 176 and accompanying text.
"Id. at 1844.
901d.
91ld. at 1845.
92Id. at 1849 (Souter, J., dissenting). This position is in stark contrast to the Eleventh Circuit
position that was most troubled by the statute's application to "purported material." See United
States v. Williams, 444 F.3d 1286, 1298-99, 1307 (2006), rev'd, 128 S. Ct. 1830 (2008).
93 Williams, 128 S. Ct. at 1852 (Souter, J., dissenting).
941d. at 1849.
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According to Justice Souter, since virtual child pornography is protected
speech, the Act cannot criminalize any proposals regardless of what the
offeror or solicitor believes about the images. He explained:
We should hold that transaction in what turns out to be fake
pornography is better understood, not as an incomplete
attempt to commit a crime, but as a complete series of
intended acts that simply do not add up to a crime, owing to
the privileged character of the material the parties were in
fact about to deal in.
95
He rejected the majority's reliance on the Act's scienter requirement
that the defendant believe he is dealing in child pornography or inducing
another to so believe because the Act does not require the belief to be a
correct and therefore "prohibited proposals may relate to transactions in
lawful... pornography." 96 Similarly, he rejected the rule that a proposal to
commit crimes is not protected speech because it "rests on the assumption
that the proposal is actually to commit a crime, not to do an act that may
turn out to be no crime at all."97
Justice Souter found the majority's ruling to be an "unjustifiable
extension of the classic factual frustration rule." 98 In contrast to a person
who shoots an unloaded gun with the intent to kill someone, he argued that
proposals to trade images that turn out to be of a virtual child cannot
amount to a punishable attempt:
[N]o matter what the parties believe, and no matter how
exactly a defendant's actions conform to his intended
course of conduct in completing the transaction he has in
mind, if there turns out to be reasonable doubt that a real
child was used to make the photos, or none was, there
could be, respectively, no conviction and no crime. 99
He could find no justification for allowing prosecutions when photos
could turn out to be virtual.'00  According to Justice Souter, the
9'Id. at 1854.
96Id. at 1851.
97Id.
9'Id. at 1852.
99Id.
""Id. at 1855-56.
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constitutionally privileged nature of virtual pornography distinguishes it
from the run-of-the-mill mistaken drug dealer.10 He rejected the majority's
analogy to a mistaken spy who trades in unclassified documents, which also
are constitutionally privileged, by reasoning that punishing would-be
traitors will not cause lawful speech to be suppressed because unclassified
documents will continue to be published, whereas punishing would-be child
pornographers will diminish the availability of virtual child pornography. 1
02
While virtual pornography has little intrinsic value, he stated it should not
be suppressed particularly since the Court took pains in its previous child
pornography cases to set the boundaries between protected and unprotected
speech. 103
Justice Souter predicted prosecutors would avoid the difficulty of
proving a defendant knowingly traded in actual child pornography as
required under Ashcroft by simply charging defendants with pandering, thus
"dispensing with the real-child element in the underlying subject."'0 4 To
avoid an "end-run" around the First Amendment, he stated there "ought to
be no absolute rule on the relationship between attempt liability and a
frustrating mistake. '0 5 Instead, Justice Souter proposed that until the time
comes that a jury is unable to distinguish between virtual and real child
pornography (and therefore the government cannot meet its burden of
proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew the
pornography was real), a defendant's mistaken belief that he is dealing in
real child pornography should be irrelevant.1
0 6
III. FACTUAL AND LEGAL IMPOSSIBILITY: A "SEMANTICAL
THICKET"'0 7
The majority and dissenting opinions in Williams epitomize a classic
battle about the definition and scope of the impossibility doctrine. The
dissent essentially ruled that regardless of a person's intent or belief that he
was pandering or soliciting actual child pornography, since the images
could be virtual and therefore lawful, no attempt to violate the provision
Ild. at 1853.
'°
2 Id. at 1853-54.
°
3 Id. at 1854.
04id
105id
"6Id. at 1858.
"°7 United States v. Farrer, 251 F.3d 510, 513 (5th Cir. 2001).
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was possible. This analysis falls squarely within the legal impossibility
doctrine, even though the dissent never used the phrase. °8 This section
explains the history and rationale of the impossibility defense and how
Williams fits within its contours.
A. Background
A multitude of reasons and circumstances can lead to the failure of a
defendant to consummate a substantive crime. The impossibility doctrine
in attempt law considers a distinct type of failure-those that stem from
some mistake on defendant's part as to a crime's attendant circumstances,
rather than an interruption in defendant's actions. 09 A historical reluctance
to punish defendants for unconsummated crimes led to the late development
of attempt as a crime." 0 This reluctance stemmed from a fear of punishing
for thoughts alone when no outward harm occurred. It also led to the first
formulation of the impossibility doctrine that barred any culpability for
impossible attempts on the grounds that only those attempts that failed by
interruption should be punished."' Although the English courts ultimately
abandoned such a sweeping impossibility rule, the development of two
types of impossibility rested on a discomfort with inchoate offenses.
Two schools of thought have emerged in assessing attempts.12 The
objectivist theory of attempts requires that the act manifest criminality
without regard to the actor's mens rea."13 In other words, "a neutral third-
party observer could recognize the activity as criminal even if he had no
special knowledge about the offender's intention."' 114  Criminality is
manifested if the act causes social harm by raising apprehension, fear, or
alarm in the community." 5 The actor's mens rea is of lesser concern than
108 See supra notes 93-105 and accompanying text.
1o9 See supra subpart Introduction.
"
0 See Audrey Rogers, New Technology, Old Defenses: Internet Sting Operations and
Attempt Liability, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 477, 480-81 (2004); Francis Bowes Sayre, Criminal
Attempts, 41 HARV. L. REV. 821, 854 (1928).
1 See Rogers, supra note 110, at 493.
112 GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 116, 138 (1978).
13Id. at 138-39.
114 Id. at 137-39.
" 5Thomas Weigend, Why Lady Eldon Should be Acquitted: The Social Harm in Attempting
the Impossible, 27 DEPAUL L. REv. 231, 264 (1977).
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the outward appearance of the actor's conduct.' 6 The objectivist school
tends to limit attempt liability because of its focus on actions rather than
intentions. 17 In contrast, subjectivists focus on the actor's intent-if he
intends to commit a crime he is dangerous and should be punished, even if
he fails. 18 His actions merely confirm his intent." 9  Subjectivist theory
tends to expand culpability because the defendant's bad intent governs. 120
B. Factual Impossibility
Factual impossibility exists when a defendant's efforts to commit a
crime fail because a factual or physical circumstance necessary for the
crime to be completed is missing. To use a classic example, had the pocket
been full of money, the defendant pickpocket would have successfully
completed his attempt and would have stolen the money. In other words,
the attempt could have been carried out successfully had the facts been as
defendant intended. Therefore, the defendant will be guilty of attempt
culpability under the virtually undisputed rule that factual impossibility is
not a defense.' 2' Even under a restrictive objectivist approach, defendant's
actions manifest harm.
C. Legal Impossibility
According to one prominent scholar, "Legal impossibility exists if the
actor's goal is illegal, but commission of the offense is impossible due to a
factual mistake... regarding the legal status of some attendant
1 6Mens rea is relevant only after the act is deemed harmful on its face. If the defendant
intended to commit a crime, objectivists deem that he should be punished, but he did not so
intend-it just looked that way-he should not be punished. JOSHUA DRESSLER,
UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 379 (3d ed. 2001).
17 FLETCHER, supra note 112, at 138.
1181d.
"
91d.; DRESSLER, supra note 116, at 379.
12°FLETCHER, supra note 112, at 139.
121See United States v. Hamrick, 43 F.3d 877, 885 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (joining other
circuits in holding factual impossibility is not a defense to an attempt crime); United States v.
Contreras, 950 F.2d 232, 237 (5th Cir. 1991) ("[Flactual impossibility is not a defense if the crime
could have been committed had the attendant circumstances been as the actor believed them to
be."); Grill v. State, 651 A.2d 856, 858 (Md. 1995) ("[F]actual impossibility is not a defense to a
criminal attempt charge."); see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 cmt. at 307-17 (1985); ROLLIN
M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 632 (3d ed. 1982); DRESSLER, supra note
116, at 399.
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circumstance that constitutes an element of the charged offense.' ' 122  The
controversial but classic finding of legal impossibility occurred in 1906 in
People v. Jaffe, where a defendant believed he was receiving stolen goods,
when in fact, the goods had been returned to their rightful owner and thus
had lost their character as stolen, a required legal element. 123  The New
York Court of Appeals reversed the defendant's conviction of attempt to
receive stolen goods on the ground that the defendant could not complete
the offense because the legal element of stolen goods was missing, and
therefore he also could not be convicted of attempt to commit the crime.
The Jaffe court reasoned, in language that is echoed by Justice Souter some
100 years later in Williams, that "[i]f all which an accused person intends to
do would, if done, constitute no crime, it cannot be a crime to attempt to do
with the same purpose a part of the thing intended."
' 124
The relatively late development of the doctrine of attempt liability
correlates to the development of the legal impossibility defense. The
"'DRESSLER, supra note 116, at 402. Providing a definition of "legal impossibility" is
difficult because the courts have used the term to cover more than one type of attempts that are
legally impossible to complete. Professor Dressler notes two categories that fall under the general
term, "legal impossibility." Id. at 400-01. The first is "pure" or true legal impossibility, which
exists when what defendant is attempting to commit is not a crime. Id. Notwithstanding
defendant's subjective bad intentions, he is not guilty of any crime. Pure legal impossibility is a
defense in all jurisdictions. Id. at 401.
2378 N.E. 169, 169-70 (N.Y. 1906).
141d. at 170. California took an opposite approach to impossibility. In People v. Rojas, the
California Supreme Court was presented with facts identical to Jaffe and upheld the defendant's
conviction of attempting to receive stolen property. 358 P.2d 921, 922 (Cal. 1961). Instead of
focusing on what the defendant did or could not do, as the court in Jaffe did, the California
Supreme Court in Rojas focused on what the defendant intended to accomplish. Id. at 924. The
court rejected the defendant's argument of impossibility holding that impossibility is not a defense
where "the defendants had the specific intent to commit the substantive offense and that under the
circumstances as the defendants reasonably saw them they did the acts necessary to consummate
the substantive offense; but because of circumstances unknown to defendants, essential elements
of the substantive crime were lacking." Id. A California court recently reaffirmed Rojas' viability
in People v. Reed,. 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 658, 658-61 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). There, the court upheld
the defendant's conviction of attempted molestation of a child under the age of fourteen years. Id.
at 664. The defendant placed an ad in a paper and a sheriffs detective responded. Id. at 659. The
defendant argued that he could not be convicted because there was never a child under the age of
fourteen and therefore it was improper to convict him of attempt where an element of the crime
was missing. Id. at 660. The court rejected the defendant's argument, holding, "Our courts have
repeatedly ruled that persons who are charged with attempting to commit a crime cannot escape
liability because the criminal act they attempted was not completed due to an impossibility which
they did not foresee." Id. at 661.
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objectivist fear of punishment without overt evidence of intent to harm is
the common factor between attempt rules in general and legal impossibility
in particular. 125  Thus, an early commentator opined, in reasoning that
echoed the Jaffe court, "[I]f none of the consequences which the defendant
sought to achieve constitutes a crime, surely his unsuccessful efforts to
achieve his object cannot constitute a criminal attempt."'' 26
Objectivists fear convictions based on suspect evidence, such as coerced
confessions or uncorroborated testimony by informants. 27  Accordingly,
these commentators support the legal impossibility doctrine that minimizes
evidence of defendant's intent, and looks instead at defendant's actions.
For example, one scholar explained that if a man has forcible intercourse
with his wife believing it is her twin sister, he does not have the intent to
commit rape because sex, even forcible, with one's own wife could not at
the time be rape. 28  Similarly, another commentator would acquit a
defendant who, intending to kill a man, shoots at a tree stump instead, on
the grounds that there is no objective, independent evidence of defendant's
intent that can be inferred from the innocuous act of shooting at a tree
stump. 29 These rationales led to numerous examples of attempts barred by
the legal impossibility defense.1
30
125See, e.g., State v. Taylor, 133 S.W.2d 336, 340-41 (Mo. 1939); State v. Guffey, 262
S.W.2d 152, 156 (Mo. Ct. App. 1953); People v. Teal, 89 N.E. 1086, 1088 (N.Y. 1909); Booth v.
State, 398 P.2d 863, 872 (Okla. Crim. App. 1964) ("[Ilt is fundamental to our law that a man is
not punished merely because he has a criminal mind. It must be shown that he has, with that
criminal mind, done an act which is forbidden by the criminal law.").
126 Sayre, supra note 110, at 839.
127 See generally Arnold N. Enker, Impossibility in Criminal Attempts-Legality and the
Legal Process, 53 MINN. L. REV. 665 (1969).
12 8See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW 554 (3d ed. 2000); see also
Edwin R. Keedy, Criminal Attempts at Common Law, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 464, 467 (1954) ("If a
man mistaking a dummy in female dress for a woman, tries to ravish it he does not have the intent
to commit rape since the ravishment of an inanimate object cannot be rape.").
129 Rollin M. Perkins, Criminal Attempts and Related Problems, 2 UCLA L. REV. 319, 332-
33 (1955).
130See supra note 124. In discussions of legal impossibility, these cases are repeatedly cited
as examples. See, e.g., State v. Lopez, 669 P.2d 1086, 1087 (N.M. 1983); People v. Dlugash, 363
N.E.2d 1155, 1160 (N.Y. 1977); DRESSLER, supra note 116, at 402; LAFAVE supra note 128, at
514-15; R.J. Spjut, When is an Attempt to Commit an Impossible Crime a Criminal Act?, 29
ARIZ. L. REV. 247, 247 (1987); Elizabeth Jean Watters, State v. Collins: Is the Impossible Now
Possible in Ohio?, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 307, 308 (1990); Deborah M. Weiss, Note, Scope, Mistake,
and Impossibility: The Philosophy of Language and Problems of Mens Rea, 83 COLUM. L. REV.
1029, 1056 (1983).
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Over time, many courts and scholars have criticized the doctrine of legal
impossibility. 31  Most of the criticism is based on the slim semantic
difference between factual and legal impossibility. 32 As aptly pointed out
by Professor Dressier and others, "[b]y skillful characterizations, one can
describe virtually any case of hybrid legal impossibility as an example of
factual impossibility. 1 33 For example, one could turn the pickpocket
attempted larceny scenario into a case of legal impossibility if one asks
whether it is a crime to pick an empty pocket. Since a larceny cannot be
committed by picking an empty pocket, employing the rationale of the legal
impossibility cases, one cannot attempt a larceny by picking the empty
pocket. Similarly, we can turn the legal impossibility case into one of
131 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 cmt. at 307-17 (1985) (rejecting the defense, noting very
little support for the defense can be found anywhere); Weigend, supra note 115, at 237-39;
DRESSLER, supra note 116, at 403. See generally Kenneth W. Simons, Criminal Law: Mistake
and Impossibility, Law and Fact, and Culpability: A Speculative Essay, 81 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 447 (1990). Even New York rejected the Jaffe rule by statute. See N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 110.10 (McKinney 2000); see also United States v. Famer, 251 F.3d 510, 513 (5th Cir.
2001) ("[T]his circuit has properly eschewed the semantical thicket of the impossibility defense in
criminal attempt cases ...."); United States v. Damell, 545 F.2d 595, 598 (8th Cir. 1976)
(refusing to address the impossibility issue, asserting that it "lurks in a semantic swamp"); People
v. Rojas, 358 P.2d 921, 923-24 (Cal. 1961) (rejecting the defense, refusing to consider the
distinction between factual and legal impossibility); State v. Moretti, 244 A.2d 499, 503 (N.J.
1968) ("[T]he defense of impossibility is so fraught with intricacies and artificial distinctions that
the defense has little value as an analytical method for reaching substantial justice."); Jerome B.
Elkind, Impossibility in Criminal Attempts: A Theorist's Headache, 54 VA. L. REv. 20, 33-36
(1968); John F. Preis, Witch Doctors and Battleship Stalkers: The Edges of Exculpation in
Entrapment Cases, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1869, 1898 (1999) (noting hybrid legal impossibility's
implicit similarity to factual impossibility, pointing out that miscalculations involved in hybrid
impossibility cases are "at heart, still factual").
132 Part of this problem stems from the lack of parallelism in the definition of factual and legal
impossibility. For example, let us examine a common explanation of the two: "(1) Where the act
if completed would not be criminal, a situation which is usually described as a 'legal
impossibility,' and (2) where the basic or substantive crime is impossible of completion, simply
because of some physical or factual condition unknown to the defendant, a situation which is
usually described as a 'factual impossibility."' Booth v. State, 398 P.2d 863, 870 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1964). The definitions are not parallel because the former concentrates on whether the
conduct, had it been completed, would be a crime, while the latter concentrates on the reasons
why the conduct was not completed. These definitions widely used by early courts are completely
unworkable for situations of hybrid legal impossibility because they do not focus on the key
component of attempt liability-the defendant's intent. Rather the definitions look to whether the
completed transaction objectively is a crime, and thus merely defines the "pure" legal
impossibility category.
133DRESSLER, supra note 116, at 403.
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factual impossibility simply by asking whether the crime of receipt of stolen
good would have been committed had the facts been as defendant
intended.1
34
In the early 1960s, the drafters of the Model Penal Code took the
position that the distinction between factual and legal impossibility should
be abolished for a number of reasons. First, the legal impossibility doctrine
focuses unnaturally on what actually transpired rather than what defendant
believed, leading to strained reasoning at odds with conventional
understanding of terms such as intent and purpose. Second, the Model
Penal Code drafters opined that the proper approach to criminality should
focus on the dangerousness of the actor as manifested by his intent, rather
than his actions. Thus, the Model Penal Code recommended a rejection of
an objectivist approach in favor of a subjectivist viewpoint. 35
Some scholars disagree with the Model Penal Code approach. Professor
George Fletcher criticizes the subjectivist approach as turning the inquiry
on criminality inside out. He states that principles of legality demand that
"it is not the internal question of intent that should first concern us, but the
external issue whether the actor's conduct objectively constitutes 'an
attempt' to commit a recognized offense." 136 To answer this question, he
suggests a "rational motivation" test: how would the actor behave if he
knew he was mistaken about particular facts?1 37 By focusing on the way in
which the actor's mistaken beliefs influence his decision to act, Professor
Fletcher argues we can decide what is an attempt. He uses Jaffe to illustrate
his test: If the defendant was told the cloth was not stolen, he still would
have wanted and therefore we cannot say he was attempting to receive
stolen goods. 
38
Professor Fletcher acknowledges, however, that his test may not work
where a person has "idiosyncratic motives."' 139 He gives the example of a
person who engages in sexual intercourse with a girl he mistakenly believes
is under the age of consent. Professor Fletcher states that while in the
normal case, a person would be just as happy that the girl was of legal age,
it is possible a person's motivation is to have sex with a minor. He
134 See generally Simons, supra note 131, at 472-73.
135MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 cmt. at 307-17 (1985).
136FLETCHER, supra note 112, at 181.
117Id. at 160-66.
138id.
1391d. at 164.
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acknowledges this scenario is a problem with the rational motivation test
that "admittedly does not lend itself to a compelling solution" to identifying
which attempts are impossible. 140
Most jurisdictions, in keeping with the Model Penal Code
recommendation, abolished the distinction between factual and legal
impossibility, either by statute or case law. 14 1 While a few jurisdictions still
required objective proof of criminality, 142 by the end of the 1990s the courts
rarely heard impossibility cases. 143 It appeared the defense was relegated to
consideration of Lady Eldon's lace by first-year law school students as an
14Old.
14 1ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-3-202(b)(2) (1987); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-2-101(15) (2002); GA.
CODE ANN. § 16-4-4 (2002); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-4(b) (2002); IND. CODE § 35-41-5-1(b)
(2002); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3301 (2001); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:27(A) (2002); MINN.
STAT. § 609.17 (LEXIS through March 2008 Regular Session); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 110.10
(Consol. 2002); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.02(B) (LexisNexis 2002); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 161.425 (2001); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 901(b) (West 2002); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-4-
101(3)(b) (2002); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.28.020 (2002); see United States v. Quijada, 588 F.2d
1253, 1255 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Darnell, 545 F.2d 595, 597 (8th Cir. 1976); United
States v. Oviedo, 525 F.2d 881, 885 (5th Cir. 1976) (rejecting the defendant's defense of
impossibility and refusing to distinguish between factual and legal impossibility); United States v.
Duran, 884 F. Supp. 577, 580 n.5 (D.D.C. 1995), aft'd, 96 F.3d 1495 (D.C. Cir. 1996); State v.
Camer, 541 P.2d 947, 948-49 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975); State v. Curtiss, 65 P.3d 207, 210 (Idaho Ct.
App. 2002) (rejecting defendant's defense of impossibility and holding the attempt statute, IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 18-306, eliminates the defense); Van Bell v. State, 775 P.2d 1273, 1274 (Nev.
1989) (declining to distinguish between factual and legal impossibility and focusing on the
specific intent of the offense); State v. Smith, 621 A.2d 493, 501-05 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1993) (rejecting the impossibility defense and holding that the legislature showed a strong intent
to reject the defense of impossibility in the omission of the reasonable person standard in the
applicable subsection of the attempt statute); State v. Hageman, 296 S.E.2d 433, 441 (N.C. 1982)
(rejecting the impossibility defense and holding that neither "legal [n]or factual impossibility
should be used as a shield..."); State v. Ferreira, 463 A.2d 129, 132 (R.I. 1983) (rejecting the
defendant's legal impossibility defense and holding that "any type of impossibility argument, legal
or factual, is not a defense to a criminal attempt charge"); State v. Curtis, 603 A.2d 356, 358-59
(Vt. 1991) (rejecting the defendants impossibility defense while noting that the majority of
jurisdictions have followed the modem trend of rejecting such a defense).
142See Oviedo, 525 F.2d at 885. In Oviedo, the court held that the evidence was insufficient
to establish that a defendant who sold procaine, a lawful substance, to an undercover officer
intended to sell him heroin. Defendant's conviction for attempted sale of heroin was thus
reversed. The Fifth Circuit approach is also followed by the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits. United
States v. Everett, 692 F.2d 596, 600 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Innella, 690 F.2d 834, 835
( lIth Cir. 1982).
143 See generally John Hasnas, Once More unto the Breach: The Inherent Liberalism of the
Criminal Law and Liability for Attempting the Impossible, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (2002).
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exercise in mental gymnastics. 144 This lull ended with the Internet sting
cases.
D. The Internet Cases
Internet sting operations to catch would-be child molesters and those
who traffic in child pornography have generated an impressive number of
arrests and convictions. 145  They also have led to a revival of the
impossibility defense. More and more defendants claimed it was legally
impossible for them to be charged with attempting a crime against a minor
when they were communicating with an adult who was posing as a
minor. 146 Thus, jurisdictions once again had to grapple with the defense.
Many courts used the Internet cases to specifically reject the distinction
between factual and legal impossibility. 147 A prime example is People v.
Thousand, decided by the Supreme Court of Michigan. 148 The defendant, a
twenty-three-year-old male entered a chat room and began a series of
conversations with "Bekka," who described herself as a fourteen-year old
female. 149  During the conversations, which occurred over a week,
'44See SANFORD H. KADISH, ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES (8th ed. 2007). The
hypothetical is discussed in many criminal law casebooks and law review articles. See, e.g.,
JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 785 (3rd ed. 1999); Weigend,
supra note 115, at 231, 237; Enker, supra note 127, at 667.
145JANIS WOLAK ET AL., ONLINE VICTIMIZATION OF YOUTH: FIVE YEARS LATER 10
(NCMEC 2006), available at http://www.unh.edu/ccrc/pdf/CV138.pdf.
146See, e.g., Hatch v. Superior Court, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 453, 465 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000); People
v. Reed, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 658, 660 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996); Hudson v. State, 745 So.2d 997, 999
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999); Laughner v. State, 769 N.E.2d 1147, 1152 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002); State
v. Jones, 21 P.3d 569, 571 (Kan. 2001); People v. Meyers, 649 N.W.2d 123, 126 (Mich. Ct. App.
2002); Bloom v. Commonwealth, 542 S.E. 2d 18, 21 (Va. Ct. App. 2001); State v. Robins, 646
N.W.2d 287, 291 (Wis. 2002); State v. Koenck, 626 N.W.2d 359, 365 (Wis. Ct. App. 2001); see
also State v. Carlisle, 8 P.3d 391, 395 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000); Van Bell v. State, 775 P.2d 1273,
1275 (Nev. 1989) (non-Internet undercover operation involving promise of a fictitious child); cf
Laughner, 769 N.E.2d at 1152 (attempted solicitation).
147 See, e.g., United States v. Gagliardi, 506 F.3d 140, 146-47 (2d Cir. 2007); United States
v. Helder, 452 F.3d 751, 756 (8th Cir. 2006); United States v. Sims, 428 F.3d 945, 960-61 (10th
Cir. 2005); United States v. Meek, 366 F.3d 705, 717-20 (9th Cir. 2004); United States v. Root,
296 F.3d 1222, 1227, 1229 (11th Cir. 2002); United States v. Famer, 251 F.3d 510, 512-13 (5th
Cir. 2001); United States v. Hamrick, 43 F.3d 877, 885 (4th Cir. 1995). Accord Laughner, 769
N.E.2d at 1154-55.
148 631 N.W.2d 694, 699 (Mich. 2001).
149Id. at 696.
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defendant engaged "Bekka" in a series of sexually explicit conversations
and sent her a photograph of male genitalia over the Internet. 5 ° The
evidence demonstrated that the defendant believed "Bekka" was fourteen-
years-old. 15' After the defendant and "Bekka" made arrangements to meet,
the defendant was arrested and charged with, among other offenses,
attempted distribution of obscene material to a minor. In fact, "Bekka" was
an adult undercover detective. Following his arrest, the defendant moved to
quash the information on the grounds that the evidence was legally
insufficient because of the absence of a child victim.
The trial court and court of appeals agreed, ruling that it was legally
impossible to attempt the crimes with which defendant was charged.
52
Relying heavily on a subtle distinction between factual and legal
impossibility, 153 the court of appeals reasoned it was legally impossible for
the defendant to attempt to disseminate obscene materials to a minor, where
the recipient of the materials was in fact an adult. The crux of the court's
analysis was that the defendant's mistake went to the legal status of a
material element of the offense-a "minor." Since it is not a crime to send
the material to an adult, it was impossible to commit the crime.
Accordingly, it was also impossible to attempt to commit the crime because
dissemination to an adult could never be a crime.
The Supreme Court of Michigan reversed. 154 Rather than engage in the
same hair-splitting analysis undertaken by the court of appeals on whether
the case was one of factual or legal impossibility, the court ruled that
neither is a defense in Michigan. 55  The court noted that nothing in
Michigan common law recognizes legal impossibility as a defense.
5 6
Furthermore, the court examined the language and legislative history of the
Michigan attempt statute and found no indication of legislative intent to
create such a defense.
57
15Oid.
1511d.
152 People v. Thousand, 614 N.W.2d 674, 678 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000), rev'd, 631 N.W.2d 694
(Mich. 2001).
153 See supra text accompanying notes 121-24.
'
54 People, 614 N.W.2d at 705.
...1d. at 701.
156 1d.
157 Id. at 702.
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Although most appellate courts have ruled that defendants in Internet
sting cases are not shielded by a legal impossibility defense, those caught in
sting operations continue to raise the defense. 158 They are encouraged by
some courts that have continued to hold that attempt liability in Internet
sting cases is legally impossible. 59 For example, in 2007 the New Jersey
Supreme Court applied an impossibility theory in holding that a person
could not be charged with attempted sexual assault of a minor when the
alleged victim was an undercover officer.1 60 The Court found the defendant
"did not complete the criminal act, nor under the circumstances, could he
have done so. '' 16i Similarly, the highest court in Maryland reversed a
conviction of a person who tried to arrange to have sex with a person he
believed to be a minor when he was actually communicating over the
Internet with an adult undercover agent.' 62  The ruling prompted the
Maryland legislature to enact a sexual solicitation statute that prohibited
soliciting a minor "or a law enforcement officer posing as a minor."
163
1. Impossibility According To Williams
The Williams majority relied explicitly on the doctrine of factual
impossibility to support its ruling that attempts to engage in illegal activity
fall outside of First Amendment protection. As discussed in Part II above,
the majority treated would-be child pornographers no differently than drug
dealers or spies who are mistaken about their goods. Attempt liability
"'8See, e.g., United States v. Gagliardi, 506 F.3d 140, 144-45 (2d Cir. 2007); United States
v. Yakoob, No. 07-20084, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 562, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 4, 2008); United
States v. Doyle, No. 06-CR-224, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11429, at *19 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 16, 2007);
United States v. Kaye, No. 1:06CR205, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54281, at *2 (E.D. Va. Aug. 4,
2006); Johnson v. State, 159 P.3d 1096, 1098-99 (Nev. 2007).
59 See, e.g., State v. Taylor, 810 A.2d 964, 970 (Md. 2002) (ruling that trial court's dismissal
of attempt charges on grounds of legal impossibility barred re-indictment as violative of double
jeopardy principles); People, 614 N.W.2d at 676.
160 State v. Condon, 919 A.2d 178, 183 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007); see also United
States v. Helder, No. 05-00125-01-CR-W-DW, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38874, at *7 (W.D. Mo.
Aug. 5, 2005), rev'd, 452 F.3d 751 (8th Cir. 2006); United States v. Hicks, No. 05-00042-01-CR-
W-DW, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36625, at *1-2 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 29, 2005), rev'd, 457 F.3d 838
(8th Cir. 2006); Taylor, 810 A.2d at 985.
161 Condon, 919 A.2d at 183.
162 Moore v. State, 882 A.2d 256, 270 (Md. 2005).
163 MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-324 (West 2005).
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applies to all three because the factual impossibility of completing the
crimes is not a defense. 164
In contrast, the Williams dissent relied heavily, albeit implicitly, on the
legal impossibility defense. For example, Justice Souter rejected a blanket
rule that proposals to commit crimes are not protected speech because it
"rests on the assumption that the proposal is actually to commit a crime, not
to do an act that may turn out to be no crime at all." 165 This reasoning is
almost identical to that used in the classic stolen goods case where the Jaffe
court stated, "If all which an accused person intends to do would, if done,
constitute no crime, it cannot be a crime to attempt to do with the same
purpose a part of the thing intended."'
' 66
In the same vein, an early commentator supported the legal
impossibility defense by noting "if none of the consequences which the
defendant sought to achieve constitutes a crime, surely his unsuccessful
efforts to achieve his object cannot constitute a criminal attempt."'167 This
reasoning matches Justice Souter's analysis that "no matter what the parties
believe, and no matter how exactly a defendant's actions conform to his
intended course of conduct in completing the transaction he has in
mind... if [no actual child was used], there could be, respectively, no
conviction and no crime." 168
Other legal impossibility cases contain strikingly similar language to
that of Justice Souter. For example, one court found no liability for
attempted subornation of perjury where the false testimony solicited was
immaterial and therefore not perjurious, stating that "[a]n unsuccessful
attempt to do that which is not a crime when effectuated cannot be held to
be an attempt to commit the crime specified."' 169 Another court found a
defendant not guilty of an attempt to hunt out of season when he shot at a
decoy because, "[i]t is no offense to attempt to that which is not
illegal .... Neither it is it a crime to attempt to do that which is legally
impossible to do.' 70
164 See supra text accompanying notes 84-86.
165 United States v. Williams, 128 S. Ct. 1830, 1851 (2008) (Souter, J., dissenting).
166 People v. Jaffe, 78 N.E. 169, 170 (N.Y. 1906); accord State v. Taylor, 133 S.W.2d 336,
341-42 (Mo. 1939) ( "If all which an accused person intends to do would, if done, constitute no
crime, it cannot be a crime to attempt to do with the same purpose a part of the thing intended.").
167 Sayre, supra note 110, at 854-55.
68 Williams, 128 S. Ct. at 1852 (Souter, J., dissenting).
169 People v. Teal, 89 N.E. 1086, 1088 (N.Y. 1909).
170 State v. Guffey, 262 S.W.2d 152, 156 (Mo. Ct. App. 1953).
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Echoing these impossibility cases, Justice Souter stated, "[w]e should
hold that transaction in what turns out to be fake pornography is better
understood, not as an incomplete attempt to commit a crime, but as a
complete series of intended acts that simply do not add up to a crime, owing
to the privileged character of the material the parties were in fact about to
deal in." 17' Likewise, the Eleventh Circuit noted somewhat metaphysically
that "when the non-existence of illegality is a function not of the non-
existence of an illegal product but rather the non-illegality of an existing
product, the First Amendment returns to the picture."
1 72
Justice Souter urged there "ought to be no absolute rule on the
relationship between attempt liability and a frustrating mistake.' 73 Instead,
Justice Souter stated that a defendant's mistaken belief that he is dealing in
real child pornography is irrelevant. In other words, look only at the
objective act, the image itself, not what the defendant intended to obtain or
provide. Because the PROTECT Act's pandering section does not hew to
this objectivist view and instead grounds culpability on a person's beliefs
about the images he is offering or soliciting, Justice Souter found it
unconstitutional. The next section explains the danger in this reasoning.
IV. PROTECTING CHTLDREN AFTER WILLIAMS
Despite Congress' best efforts, the market for child pornography has
grown immensely as technology has allowed easy creation and transmission
of pornographic images. The global market has significantly diminished
law enforcement's ability to catch pornographers, and it is becoming more
and more apparent that the free versus banned speech line needs redrawing.
Previous cases ruled that harm to actual children is the linchpin in assessing
the constitutionality of legislative bans on speech. Direct harm is evident
when an actual child is depicted in an image, but would-be pornographers
also endanger children. Those who seek to find or offer to provide child
pornography are no different than any other person who attempts to commit
a crime. The impossibility of the task should not matter.
' Williams, 128 S. Ct. at 1854 (Souter, J., dissenting).
172United States v. Williams, 444 F.3d 1286, 1304 (11th Cir. 2006), rev'd, 128 S. Ct. 1830
(2008) (quoting Stopping Child Pornography: Protecting our Children and the Constitution:
Hearing on S. 2530 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of
Frederick Schauer, Professor, Harvard School of Law)).
' Williams, 128 S. Ct. at 1854 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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Justice Souter's analysis (and that of the Eleventh Circuit) fits squarely
within the legal impossibility doctrine. The question is why hearken back
to it? The early supporters of the doctrine feared punishment without
adequate proof of intent. Actions taken by seemingly respectable
individuals could be misconstrued by aggressive prosecutors. The
merchant who receives goods he believes are stolen, the hunter who shoots
at a deer off-season but hits a decoy, and the man who has intercourse with
a person he believes is not his wife could all be at risk. 174 According to the
proponents of the legal impossibility defense, we cannot be sure the
merchant was intending to receive stolen property, the hunter wanted a live
deer, or the man wanted to have extramarital sex. Unless the harm is
manifest, i.e, apparent to an objective viewer, the actor could be punished
merely for bad thoughts, or punished on proof of harm that prosecutors
obtain through coerced confessions or other improper evidentiary tactics. 175
These concerns appear to be at the root of the Williams dissent and the
Eleventh Circuit ruling. The Eleventh Circuit feared that a person could be
prosecuted based on the "wholly subjective determination" by law
enforcement personnel who misconstrue innocent communication as
pandering or soliciting of child pornography. 176 For example, it cites an
email that states "Little Janie in the bath-hubba, hubba!" as grounds for a
pandering prosecution, even if the pictures themselves are completely
innocent. In other words, if the picture turns out to be wholly innocent, it
should shield the defendant regardless of his desire to trade in child
pornography. Just like the merchant, hunter, or husband discussed above,
according to Justice Souter and the Eleventh Circuit, one who trades in
photographs should not be prosecuted based merely on his intent to engage
in child pornography when his outward conduct appears to be legal.
To best protect children we need to dispel any lingering doubts about
the dangers pedophiles pose to children in cyberspace. Skeptics may
suggest that the chatter over the Internet is just that-a verbalizing of bad
thoughts. The statistics may show otherwise. For example, a 2005 study of
child pornography possessors conducted by the National Center for Missing
and Exploited Children, found more than eighty percent of arrested child
174See supra text accompanying notes 125-29.
175See supra text accompanying note 127-28.
176 Williams, 444 F.3d at 1306. The Court gave the hypothetical as part of its vagueness
analysis, but its analysis is relevant to the fear of overzealous prosecutions raised by proponents of
the legal impossibility doctrine.
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pornography possessors had images of prepubescent children, and eighty
percent had images of children being sexually penetrated.177 Twenty
percent of the defendants had images of children enduring sadistic sex and
bondage178 and thirty-nine percent had videos of children being abused. 79
Thus, the vast majority of possessors of child pornography are viewing
hard-core child pornography.
The Center estimates one in seven children receives a sexual solicitation
over the Internet.' 80 In addition, an alarming link may exist between
possession of child pornography and sexual molestation. A recent study by
psychologists at the Federal Bureau of Prisons found that eighty-five
percent of individuals charged with possessing child pornography admitted
that they also sexually abused children.' 81 The study's results were so
shocking the prison bureau ordered the paper containing the results of the
survey be withdrawn from publication pending further investigation.
Earlier, more conservative estimates still placed the percentage of child
pornography possessors who had also molested or attempted to molest
children at fifty-five percent.
182
The refusal to acknowledge the full extent of the very real danger by
bad actors has led to the revival of the legal impossibility defense. Yet, the
Internet cases provide a findamental reason for eliminating the defense.
The very nature of the Internet cases obviates concerns about improper
punishment or prosecution tactics.' 83 The evidence trail is produced by the
177JANIS WOLAK ET AL., CHILD-PORNOGRAPHY POSSESSORS ARRESTED IN INTERNET-
RELATED CRIMES: FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL JUVENILE ONLINE VICTIMIZATION STUDY vii
(NCMEC 2005), available at http://www.missingkids.com/enUS/publications/NC 144.pdf.
178id
179id.
18 0WOLAK, supra note 145, at vii.
181 Julian Sher & Benedict Carey, Debate on Child Pornography's Link to Molesting, N.Y.
TIMES, July 19, 2007, available at, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/19/us/19sex.html?_r1l&
oref=slogin. The study was conducted at the Federal Correctional Institution in Butner, N.C. of
155 male inmates serving sentences for possession or distribution of child pornography.
182 See WOLAK, supra note 177, at 16. It is not clear whether it is the images that incite the
prurient interest in children, or whether the interest leads to the collecting of child pornography.
Regardless, the danger to children is significant.
183 Challenges to Internet sting operations on the basis of entrapment have largely failed as
law enforcement officials are well-trained in setting up proper stings. See Rogers, supra note 110,
at 502 n.97.
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defendant in his Internet searches and a record of his intent is contained in
the Internet communications. 114
While seeking pictures of children could be objectively innocent
conduct, the nature of the Internet communications, and the images traded
make clear the intent behind the actor's conduct.1 85  If the actor wants
virtual child pornography, or images of child-like adults, he can make that
clear by the areas he visits in cyberspace and in the Internet
communications he makes. In contrast, a person who trolls the Internet
looking for child pornography should be held to his word. Even the
Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that "posting in a known child pornography
chat room would clearly spotlight the true child abuser."
186
Professor Fletcher, who generally supports a legal impossibility defense,
acknowledges the conduct of those with "idiosyncratic motives" may
amount to a punishable attempt. 187 Another scholar who otherwise supports
the legal impossibility defense notes that punishing "unusual criminals"
who verbalize their criminal intent while performing otherwise innocent-
appearing acts is proper because it does not increase the risk of enforcement
error or abuse. 88  The cyber-space panderer fits squarely within these
examples and should not escape punishment.
184See Rogers, supra note 110, at 512-13; see also, Peter Westen, Impossibility Attempts: A
Speculative Thesis, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 523, 540 (2008).
185 The Internet communications fit remarkably well with Professor Weigend's proposal that
impossibility cases be judged by statements an actor makes which accompany his actions. If they
arouse alarm or apprehension to the average observer, attempt liability is appropriate. See
Weigend, supra note 115, at 266-70. He uses the rather infamous example of a man who shoots
at a tree stump believing it to be his enemy and is cleared of attempted murder on the grounds of
legal impossibility. Id. at 267-78. If there was no evidence other than the act of shooting, no
apprehension would occur and therefore no attempt liability. If, however, there was evidence that
the shooter stated to his companion before shooting that he was out to get his enemy, the act of
shooting would cause alarm and the actor should be found guilty of attempted murder. Using this
alarm test in the context of attempted offenses against a minor, Internet communications taking
place before the actor sets out to meet his victim, make clear that he intends to meet a minor.
186 United States v. Williams, 444 F.3d 1286, 1307 (11th Cir. 2006), rev'd, 128 S. Ct. 1830
(2008).
187 See supra text accompanying notes 136-40.
188Hasnas, supra note 143, at 68 n.186.
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CONCLUSION
The struggles Congress and the courts have had finding a balance
between protected speech and illegal conduct is exemplified in the Williams
opinion. The majority upheld Congress' latest effort to protect children by
punishing those who seek to obtain or provide child pornography, yet the
dissent remained concerned that this tactic improperly suppresses protected
speech. Both sides turned to competing aspects of the impossibility defense
for support, and the two views on impossibility are reflective of the struggle
to measure criminal culpability. Should we consider defendant's beliefs as
subjectivists would, or should we look solely at his acts as objectivists
demand? The former would find that defendant's mistake of fact as to the
nature of pornographic images is not a defense, whereas the latter would
find that if the images turn out to be legal because they do not involve
minors, culpability is legally impossible.
The answer lies in the nature of the problem. The Internet has vastly
increased the child pornography market. Yet, it has also allowed us to peek
into the mind of the predator, and we should take him at his word. If he
seeks to provide or obtain child pornography and acts accordingly, he
should not be shielded by the impossibility of reaching his goal.
[Vol. 61:2
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